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Abstract
The Fiat-Shamir (FS) transform uses a hash function to generate, without any further over-
head, non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) argument systems from constant-round public-
coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge (public-coin HVZK) proof systems. In the proof of zero
knowledge, the hash function is modeled as a programmable random oracle (PRO).
In TCC 2015, Lindell embarked on the challenging task of obtaining a similar transform with
improved heuristic security. Lindell showed that, for several interesting and practical languages,
there exists an efficient transform in the non-programmable random oracle (NPRO) model that
also uses a common reference string (CRS). A major contribution of Lindell’s transform is that
zero knowledge is proved without random oracles and this is an important step towards achieving
efficient NIZK arguments in the CRS model without random oracles.
In this work, we analyze the efficiency and generality of Lindell’s transform and notice a
significant gap when compared with the FS transform. We then propose a new transform that
aims at filling this gap. Indeed our transform is almost as efficient as the FS transform and can
be applied to a broad class of public-coin HVZK proof systems. Our transform requires a CRS
and an NPRO in the proof of soundness, similarly to Lindell’s transform.
1 Introduction
Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs1 introduced in [DMP87, BFM88, BDMP91] are
widely used in Cryptography. Such proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier with just one
message about the membership of an instance x in a language L without leaking any additional
information. NIZK proofs are not possible without a setup assumption and the one proposed
initially in [BDMP91] is the existence of a Common Reference String (CRS) received as input
both by the prover and the verifier. The CRS model has been so far the standard setup for
1When discussing informally we will use the word proof to mean both an unconditionally sound proof and a
computationally sound proof (i.e., an argument). Only in the more formal part of the paper we will make a distinction
between arguments and proofs.
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NIZK. Another setup that has been proposed in literature is the existence of registered public keys
in [BCNP04, DFN06, VV09, CG15].
Starting with the breakthrough of [FLS90, FLS99] we know that NIZK proofs in the CRS
model exist for any NP language with the additional appealing feature of using just one CRS for any
polynomial number of proofs. Moreover NIZK proofs and their stronger variations [Sah99, DCO+01,
GOS06] have been shown to be not only interesting for their original goal of being a non-interactive
version of classic zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs [GMR85, GMR89], but also because they are powerful
building blocks in many applications (e.g., for CCA encryption [NY90], ZAPs [DN00, DN07]).
Efficient NIZK. Generic constructions of NIZK proofs are rather inefficient since they require to
first compute an NP reduction and then to apply the NIZK proof for a given NP-complete language
to the instance given in output by the reduction. A significant progress in efficiency has been
proposed in [GS08] where several techniques have been proposed to obtain efficient NIZK proofs
that can be used in bilinear groups.
The most popular use of NIZK proofs in real-world scenarios consists in taking an efficient
interactive constant-round public-coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) proof system and in
making it a NIZK argument through the so called Fiat-Shamir (FS) transform [FS86]. The FS
transform replaces the verifier by calls to a hash function on input the transcript so far. In the
random oracle [BR93] (RO) model the hash function can only be evaluated through calls to an
oracle that answers as a random function. The security proof allows the simulator for HVZK to
program the RO (i.e., the simulator decides how to answer to a query) and this allows to convert
the entire transcript of a public-coin HVZK proof into a single message that is indistinguishable
from the single message computed by a honest NIZK prover. The efficiency of the FS transform led
to many practical applications. The transform is also a method to obtain signatures of knowledge,
as discussed in [CL06].
In [Gro04] Groth showed an efficient transform for NIZK where soundness is proved requiring
a programmable RO while no random oracle is needed to prove zero knowledge.
The risks of the FS transform. The main disadvantage of the FS transform is the fact that
the random oracle methodology has been proved to be unsound both in general [CGH98] and for
the specific case [GK03, BDSG+13] of turning identification schemes into signatures as considered
in [FS86]. Nevertheless, the examples of constructions proved secure in the RO model and insecure
for any concrete hash function are seemingly artificial. Interestingly in [GOSV14] it is shown that
the FS transform can be used to obtain (non-artificial) information-theoretic NIZK arguments that
are not sound when knowledge of the description of the hash functions is used by the adversarial
prover.
A slight modification of the FS transform gives as input to the hash function only the first
round of a three-round protocol, without the instance to be proved. Despite the fact that this
approach, called weak FS transform, has been used is literature, [BPW12] showed the insecurity
of the transform when the some HVZK protocols are used (similar issues have been discussed
in [CPS+16b, CPS+16c] in the standard model). Other weaknesses about the non-malleability
of the FS transform are discussed in [FKMV12]. In contrast, there are some recent positive re-
sults [KRR16, MV16] based on obfuscation.
The FS transform applied to 3-round HVZK proofs is still one of the major uses of the RO model
for real-world protocols, therefore any progress in this research direction (either on the security of
the transform, or on its efficiency, or on its generality) is of extreme interest.
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Efficient NIZK with designated/registered verifiers. A first attempt to get efficient NIZK
arguments from some restricted class of 3-round public-coin HVZK proofs without ROs was done
by [DFN06] (the proof of soundness required complexity leveraging) and later on by [VV09, CG15]
that achieved a weaker form of soundness in the registered public-key model. The limitation of this
model is that a NIZK proof can be verified only by a designated verifier (i.e., the proof requires
a secret known to the verifier). Moreover there is an inconvenient preliminary registration phase
where the verifier has to register her public key.
Lindell’s transform. Very recently, in [Lin15], Lindell proposed a very interesting transform
that can be seen as an attempt towards obtaining efficient constructions without random oracles.
Starting from a Σ-protocol for a language L (i.e., a special type of 3-round public-coin HVZK
proof used already in several efficient constructions of zero knowledge [Dam00, MP03, DCV05,
Vis06, CDV06, YZ07, ABB+10, OPV10, SV12]), Lindell shows how to construct an efficient NIZK2
argument system for L in the CRS model. Two are the major advantages of Lindell’s transform with
respect to the FS transform. First, in Lindell’s transform the proof of ZK does not need the existence
of a random oracle and this allows to avoid some issues due to protocol composition [Wee09]. We
remark that the proof of ZK for Lindell’s transform needs a CRS but this is unavoidable as one-
round ZK in the plain model is possible only for trivial languages. Second, the soundness of Lindell’s
transform can be proved by relying on a non-programmable random oracle (NPRO). An NPRO is
a RO that in the protocol and in the security proofs can be used only as a black box and can
not be programmed by a simulator or by the adversary of a reduction. This is a considerable
advantage compared to the FS transform since replacing a RO by an NPRO is a step towards
removing completely the need of ROs in a cryptographic construction. Indeed the work of Lindell
goes precisely in the direction of solving a major open problem in Cryptography: obtaining an
efficient RO-free transform for NIZK arguments to be used in place of the FS transform.
The main drawback of Lindell’s transform is that it requires extra computation on top of the
one needed to run the Σ-protocol for the language L. In contrast, the FS transform does not incur
into any overhead on top of a 3-round public-coin HVZK proof for L. In addition, since 3-round
public-coin HVZK proofs are potentially less demanding than Σ-protocols, we have that requiring
a Σ-protocol as starting protocol for a transform instead of a public-coin HVZK proof may already
result in an efficiency loss.
Lindell’s transform is based on a primitive named dual-mode (DM) commitment scheme (DMCS).
A DMCS is based on a membership-hard language Λ and each specific commitment takes as input
an instance ρ of Λ and has the following property: if ρ 6∈ Λ, the DM commitment is perfectly
binding; on the other hand, if ρ ∈ Λ, the DM commitment can be arbitrarily equivocated if a
witness for ρ ∈ Λ is known. Moreover, the two modes are indistinguishable3. Lindell showed that
DMCSs can be constructed efficiently from Σ-protocols for membership-hard languages and also
provided a concrete example based on the language of Diffie-Hellman tuples (DH). Then, Lindell’s
transform shows how to combine DM commitments and Σ-protocols along with a hash function4
to obtain an efficient NIZK argument.
2Lindell’s NIZK argument is a not an argument of knowledge in contrast to the NIZK argument obtained through
an FS transform.
3A similar notion was introduced in [CV05, CV07] and a scheme with similar features was proposed in [DG03].
4In the proof of soundness this function will be modeled as an NPRO.
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1.1 Our Results
In this paper, we continue the study of generic and efficient transforms from 3-round public-coin
HVZK proofs to NIZK arguments.
We start by studying the generality and efficiency of Lindell’s transform in terms of the Σ-
protocol used for instantiating the DMCS (and in turn instantiating the CRS) and the Σ-protocol
to which the transform is applied. As a result, we point out a significant gap in generality and
efficiency of Lindell’s transform compared to the FS transform.
Then we show an improved transform that is based on weaker requirements. Specifically, our
transform only requires computational HVZK and optimal soundness instead of perfect special
HVZK5 and special soundness. More interestingly and surprisingly despite being based on weaker
requirements, our transform is also significantly more efficient than Lindell’s transform and very
close to the efficiency of the FS transform. We next discuss our contributions in more details.
The classes of Σ-protocols needed in [Lin15]. Lindell defines Σ-protocols as 3-round public-
coin proofs that enjoy perfect special HVZK and special soundness. The former property means
that the simulator on input any valid statement x and challenge e can compute (a, z) such that the
triple (a, e, z) is perfectly indistinguishable from an accepting transcript where the verifier sends
e as challenge. Special soundness instead means that from any two accepting transcripts (a, e, z)
and (a, e′, z′) for the same statement x that share the first message but have different challenges
e 6= e′, one can efficiently compute a witness w for x ∈ L. Lindell in [Lin14] shows a construction
of a DMCS from any (defined as above) Σ-protocol for a membership-hard language6.
The efficiency of Lindell’s transform. Lindell’s transform uses a DMCS derived from a Σ-
protocol ΠΛ = (PΛ,VΛ) for language Λ whose commitment algorithm com works by running the
simulator of ΠΛ. The CRS contains an instance ρ of Λ along with the description of a hash
function h. The argument produced by the NIZK Π = (P,V) for x ∈ L starting from a Σ-protocol
ΠL = (PL,VL) for L is computed as a tuple (a′, e, z, r) where a′ = com(a, r), e = h(x|a′), and z is
the 3rd round of ΠL answering to the challenge e and having a as first round. The verifier checks
that a′ is a commitment of a with randomness r, that e is the output of h(x|a′) and that (a, e, z)
is accepted by VL.
As an example, in [Lin15] Lindell discussed the use of the Σ-protocol for the language DH for
which the transform produces a very efficient NIZK proof; indeed the additional cost is of only 8
modular exponentiations: 4 to be executed by the prover and 4 by the verifier.
In this work we notice however that there is a caveat when analyzing the efficiency of Lindell’s
transform. The caveat is due to the message space of the DMCS. Indeed, once the CRS is fixed
the max length of a message that can be committed to with only one execution of com is limited
to the challenge length lΛ of ΠΛ. Therefore in case the first round a of ΠL is much longer than lΛ,
the transform of Lindell requires multiple executions of com therefore suffering of a clear efficiency
loss.
We show indeed in Tables 2 and 3 that Lindell’s transform can generate in the resulting NIZK
argument a blow up of the computations compared to what PL and VL actually do, and therefore
compared to the FS transform.
5The last version of Lindell’s transform [Lin14] works by assuming just perfect special HVZK instead of strong
perfect special HVZK needed in [Lin15].
6The construction in [Lin15] needs an additional property that however is enjoyed by classic Σ-protocols as we
discuss in App. A.
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1.1.1 Our Transform
In this paper, we present a different transform that is closer to the FS transform both on generality
and on efficiency.
Our transform can be used to obtain a NIZK for any language L with a 3-round HVZK proofs
enjoying optimal soundness (i.e., a weaker soundness requirement compared to special soundness).
The CRS can be instantiated based on any membership-hard language Λ with a 3-round HVZK
proofs enjoying optimal soundness. More specifically, we do not require perfect HVZK nor special
HVZK for the involved Σ-protocols. Moreover, instead of special soundness, we will just require
that, for any false statement and any first round message a, there is at most one challenge c that
can be answered correctly. This is clearly a weaker requirement than special soundness and was
already used by [MP03].
Essentially we just need that both protocols ΠL and ΠΛ are 3-round public-coin HVZK proofs
with optimal soundness. Our transform produces a NIZK argument Π = (P,V) that does not
require multiple executions of ΠL and ΠΛ and, therefore, it remains efficient under any scenario
without suffering of the previously discussed issue about challenge spaces in Lindell’s transform.
Techniques. We start by considering the FS transform in the NPRO model and by noticing that,
as already claimed and proved in [YZ06], if the original 3-round public-coin HVZK proof is witness
indistinguishable (WI)7, then the transformed protocol is still WI, and of course the proof of WI
is RO free.
Notice that as in [Lin15], P and V need a common hash function (modeled as an NPRO in
the soundness proof) to run the protocol and this can be enforced through a setup (i.e., a non-
programmable CRS [Pas03], or a global hash function [CLP13]). The use of the FS transform in
the NPRO model is not sufficient for our purposes. Indeed we want generality and the HVZK
proof might not be witness indistinguishable. Moreover we should make a witness available to the
simulator. We solve this problem by using the OR composition of 3-round perfect HVZK proofs
proposed in [CDS94]. We will let the prover P for NIZK to prove that either x ∈ L ∨ ρ ∈ Λ. We
notice that in [CDS94] the proposed OR composition is proved to guarantee WI only when applied
to two instances of the same language having a public-coin perfect HVZK proof. We can avoid
this limitation using a generalization discussed already in [GMY03, GMY06] that allows the OR
composition of different protocols for different languages relying on computational HVZK only.
1.2 Comparison
Here we compare the computational effort, both for the prover and the verifier, required to execute
Lindell’s NIZK argument, our NIZK argument and the FS one. The properties of the three trans-
forms are summarized in Table 1. The cost for the prover can be found in Table 2, while the one
for the verifier can be found in Table 3. The comparison of the computational effort is performed
with respect to three Σ-protocols8. Roughly speaking, in the comparisons, we consider the CRS
to contain an instance of the the language DH of Diffie-Hellman triples with respect to 1024-bit
prime pcrs and consider two Σ-protocols: the one to prove that a triples is Diffie-Hellman
9 with
respect to a prime p, for which we consider the cases in which p is 1024-bit and 2048-bit long10, and
7We use WI both to mean witness indistinguishable and witness indistinguishability.
8We consider the same Σ-protocol discussed in [Lin15] and in addition we consider the one for Graph Isomorphism
since it has the special property of having a very long first round that can be computed very efficiently.
9See Section 6 for a formal definition of the polynomial relation and the respective Σ-protocols.
10Clearly, in case p is such that |p| < |pcrs|, then Lindell’s transform has a slightly smaller number of exponentiations
with respect to the number of exponentiations that we count in the tables.
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the Σ-protocol for graph isomorphism (GI). For the Σ-protocol for graph isomorphism, we count
only the modular exponentiations and do not count other operations (e.g., random selection of a
permutation and generation of the adjacency matrix of permuted graphs) since they are extremely
efficient and clearly dominated by the cost of modular exponentiations. A detailed description of
the Σ-protocols and of the way we measure the computational effort is found in Section 6.
The tables give evidence of the fact that while Lindell’s transform on some specific cases can
replace the FS transform by paying a small overhead, in other cases there is a significant loss in
performance. Our transform instead remains very close to the FS transform both when considering
the amount of computation and when considering the generality of the protocols that can be given
as input to the transform.
Transform HV ZK for Λ HV ZK for L Soundness Model
Lindell [Lin14] special + perfect special + perfect special NPRO+CRS
This paper computational computational optimal NPRO+CRS
FS / computational classic PRO
Table 1: Requirements for the proofs in input to the three transforms.
DH GI
Transform |p| = 1024 |p| = 2048 n vertices
Lindell [Lin14] 2 mod p+ 12 mod pcrs 2 mod p+ 20 mod pcrs 4n
2 mod pcrs
This paper 2 mod p+ 4 mod pcrs 2 mod p+ 4 mod pcrs 4 mod pcrs
FS 2 mod p 2 mod p /
Table 2: Efficiency of the three transforms: modular exponentiations for the prover.
DH GI
Transform |p| = 1024 |p| = 2048 n vertices
Lindell [Lin14] 4 mod p+ 12 mod pcrs 4 mod p+ 20 mod pcrs 4n
2 mod pcrs
This paper 4 mod p+ 4 mod pcrs 4 mod p+ 4 mod pcrs 4 mod pcrs
FS 4 mod p 4 mod p /
Table 3: Efficiency of the three transforms: modular exponentiations for the verifier.
Which protocols can be given in input to the transform? We stress that our transform
allows for additional proof systems to be used for instantiating the CRS and for obtaining a NIZK
argument system. This is not only a theoretical progress. Indeed there exist efficient constructions
such as the one of [Vis06] that is a variation of the one of [MP03]. The construction of [Vis06]
is an efficient 3-round HVZK proof system with optimal soundness for a language L and is not a
Σ-protocol for the corresponding relation RL. For further details, see App. B.
2 HVZK Proof Systems and Σ-Protocols
We denote the security parameter by n and use “|” as concatenation operator (i.e., if a and b are
two strings then by a|b we denote the concatenation of a and b). For a finite set S, x← S denotes
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the algorithm that chooses x from S with uniform distribution.
A polynomial-time relation R (or polynomial relation, in short) is a subset of {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗
such that membership of (x,w) in R can be decided in time polynomial in |x|. For (x,w) ∈ R,
we call x the instance and w a witness for x. For a polynomial-time relation R, we define the
NP-language LR as LR = {x|∃w : (x,w) ∈ R}. Analogously, unless otherwise specified, for an
NP-language L we denote by RL the corresponding polynomial-time relation (that is, RL is such
that L = LRL). We will model a random oracle as a random function O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n.
We remark that for simplicity we will omit the modulus in modular arithmetic calculations.
For two interactive machines A and B, we denote by 〈A(α), B(β)〉(γ) the distribution of B’s
output after running on private input β with A using private input α, both running on common
input γ.
Definition 1 (Proof/argument system). A pair of PPT interactive algorithms (PL,VL) constitutes
a proof system (resp., an argument system) for an NP-language L, if the following conditions hold:
• Completeness. For every x ∈ L and w such that (x,w) ∈ RL, it holds that:
Prob [ 〈PL(w),VL〉(x) = 1 ] = 1.
• Soundness. For every interactive (resp., PPT interactive) algorithm P?L, there exists a negli-
gible function ν such that for every x /∈ L and every z:
Prob [ 〈P?L(z),VL〉(x) = 1 ] < ν(|x|).
An interactive protocol ΠL = (PL,VL) is public coin if, at every round, VL simply tosses a
predetermined number of coins (random challenge) and sends the outcome to the prover.
In a 3-round public-coin protocol ΠL = (PL,VL) for an NP-language L, PL and VL receive the
common input x and w such that (x,w) ∈ RL as private input (here and in the rest of the paper we
use n = |x| as a security parameter). The interaction, with challenge length l, proceeds as follows:
The 3-round public-coin protocol ΠL:
1. PL, on input 1n, x and w, computes message a and sends it to VL.
2. VL chooses a random challenge e← {0, 1}l and sends it to PL.
3. PL, on input x, w, e, and the randomness used to compute a, computes message z and sends
it to VL.
4. VL decides to accept or reject based on its view (i.e., (x, a, e, z)).
A triple (a, e, z) of messages exchanged during the execution of a 3-round proof (resp., argument)
system is called a 3-round transcript. We say that a 3-round transcript (a, e, z) is an accepting
transcript for x if the argument system ΠL instructs VL to accept based on the values (x, a, e, z).
Two accepting 3-rounds transcripts (a, e, z) and (a′, e′, z′) for an instance x constitute a collision if
a = a′ and e 6= e′.
Definition 2. A 3-round proof or argument system ΠL = (PL,VL) for NP-language L is Honest-
Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK) if there exists a PPT simulator algorithm Sim that takes as input
security parameter 1n and instance x ∈ L and outputs an accepting transcript for x. Moreover, the
distribution of the output of the simulator on input x is computationally indistinguishable from the
distribution of the honest transcript obtained when VL and PL run ΠL on common input x and any
private input w such that (x,w) ∈ RL.
If the transcripts are identically distributed we say that ΠL is perfect HVZK.
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Definition 3. A 3-round public-coin proof system ΠL = (PL,VL) for language L with challenge
length l enjoys optimal soundness if for every x 6∈ L and for every first-round message a there is
at most one challenge e ∈ {0, 1}l for which there exists a third-round message z such that (a, e, z)
is accepting for x.
Note that any 3-round public-coin optimally sound proof system with challenge length l has
soundness error 2−l [MP03].
Definition 4. A 3-round public-coin proof system ΠL = (PL,VL) with challenge length l is a
Σ-protocol for an NP-language L if it enjoys the following properties:
• Completeness. If (x,w) ∈ RL then all honest 3-round transcripts for (x,w) are accepting.
• Special Soundness. There exists an efficient algorithm Extract that, on input x and a collision
for x, outputs a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ RL.
• Special Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (special HVZK). There exists a PPT simulator al-
gorithm Sim that takes as input security parameter 1n, x ∈ L and e ∈ {0, 1}l and outputs
an accepting transcript for x where e is the challenge. Moreover for all l-bit strings e, the
distribution of the output of the simulator on input (x, e) is perfect indistinguishable from the
distribution of the 3-round honest transcript obtained when VL sends e as challenge and PL
runs on common input x and any private input w such that (x,w) ∈ RL.
Sometimes, we will abuse notion and say that a proof system or Σ-protocol is for a polynomial
relation R instead of referring to NP-language LR.
It is easy to see that Σ-protocols enjoy optimal soundness. The converse, however, is not true.
See Appendix B for an example of an optimal-sound 3-round public-coin proof system that does
not enjoy special soundness (and is special perfect HVZK).
2.1 3-Round Public-Coin HVZK Proofs and WI
Following [GMY03], for an NP-language L, we define Lˆ to be the input language that includes both
L and all false instances that are well formed and can be used by an adversarial prover in order to
prove a false statement. More formally, L ⊆ Lˆ and membership in Lˆ can be tested in polynomial
time. We implicitly assume that a verifier executes the protocol only if the common input x ∈ Lˆ;
otherwise, it rejects immediately.
Definition 5. A 3-round public-coin proof system Π = (PL,VL) is Witness Indistinguishable (WI)
for polynomial relation R if, for every malicious verifier V?L, there exists a negligible function ν
such that for all x, w, w′ with (x,w) ∈ R and (x,w′) ∈ R, it holds that:∣∣Prob [ 〈PL(w),V?L〉(x) = 1 ]− Prob [ 〈PL(w′),V?L〉(x) = 1 ]∣∣ ≤ ν(|x|).
The notion of a perfect WI 3-round proof system is obtained by requiring that ν(|x|) = 0.
Sometimes we abuse the above definition and say that a proof system is WI for a NP-language
L instead of referring to the associated polynomial relation RL.
We recall the following result.
Theorem 1 ([CDS94]). Every 3-round public-coin proof system with perfect HVZK for an NP-
language L is perfect WI for RL.
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2.2 Challenge Lengths of 3-Round HVZK Proofs
Challenge-length amplification. The challenge of a 3-round public-coin proof system with
HVZK and optimal soundness can be extended through parallel repetition.
Lemma 1. Let ΠL be a 3-round public-coin proof system with optimal soundness for NP-language
L that enjoys perfect HVZK and has challenge length l. The protocol ΠkL consisting of k parallel
instances of ΠL is a 3-round public-coin proof system for relation L that enjoys perfect HVZK, has
optimal soundness and has challenge length k · l.
Proof. The HVZK it is preserved by ΠkL for the same arguments of [CDS94]. About the optimal
soundness of ΠkL, it is simple to see that if the protocol Π
k
L in not optimal sound then also ΠL is
not optimal sound.
A similar lemma can be proved for a Σ-protocol (as in [GMY06, CPS+15, CPS+16a]) for which
HVZK is not perfect.
Challenge-length reduction. We now show that starting from any 3-round public-coin proof
system that enjoys HVZK and has optimal soundness with challenge length l, one can construct a
3-round public-coin proof system that still enjoys HVZK, has optimal soundness but works with
a shorter challenge. Moreover perfect HVZK is preserved. A similar transformation was shown
in [Dam10] for the case of Σ-protocol that are special perfect HVZK.
Lemma 2. Let ΠL be a HVZK 3-round public-coin proof system for L with optimal soundness and
challenge length l. Then for every l′ < l, there exists a 3-round public-coin proof system Π′L for L
with HVZK and optimal soundness and challenge length l′. Protocol Π′L has the same efficiency as
ΠL and, moreover, if ΠL is perfect HVZK so is Π
′
L.
Proof. We now give a description of Π′L.
Common input: instance x for an NP-language L.
Private input of P ′L: w s.t. (x,w) ∈ RL.
The protocol Π′L:
1. P ′L computes a← PL(x,w) and sends it to V ′L; 11
2. V ′L randomly chooses challenge e← {0, 1}l
′
and sends it to P ′L;
3. P ′L randomly chooses pad ← {0, 1}(l−l
′), sets e′ = e|pad, computes z ← PL(x,w, a, e′) and
sends z′ = (z, pad) to V ′L;
4. V ′L outputs the output of VL(x, a, e|pad, z).
Completeness follows directly from the completeness of Π.
To prove the HVZK we can consider the simulator Sim′, that on input x runs as follows:
1. run (a, e′, z)← Sim(x);
2. set pad equal to the last l − l′ bits of e′, and set e equal to the fist l′ bits of e′;
11In all our protocol descriptions we refer to a prover as a stateful algorithm, that depending on the received input
he computes the next (i.e., first or the third) round of the protocol. Also, because all our protocols are public coin,
we do not make a distinction between the verifier algorithm and the algorithm that decides whether to accept or not
at the end of the interaction with the prover.
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3. output (a, e, (z, pad)).
To conclude the proof we only observe that the optimal soundness follows directly from the optimal
soundness of Π.
The following theorem follows from Lemma 1 and 2,
Theorem 2. Suppose NP-language L admits a HVZK 3-round public-coin proof system ΠL that
has optimal soundness and challenge length l. Then for any l′ > 0 there exists HVZK 3-round
public-coin proof system Π′L that has optimal soundness and challenge length l
′. If l′ ≤ l then Π′L is
as efficient as ΠL. Otherwise the communication and computation complexities of Π
′
L are at most
dl′/le times the ones of ΠL. Moreover, perfect HVZK is preserved.
2.3 3-Round Public-Coin HVZK Proofs for OR Composition of Statements
In this section we recall the construction of [CDS94] that starts from a HVZK 3-round public-coin
proof system ΠL for an NP-language L and constructs a HVZK 3-round public-coin proof system
ΠL∨L for the “OR” language of L; that is the NP-language
L ∨ L = {(x0, x1) : x0 ∈ L ∨ x1 ∈ L}.
Below we give the descriptions of the prover PL∨L and of the verifier VL∨L of ΠL∨L. In the
description, we let Sim denote the simulator for ΠL and l denote the challenge length of ΠL. We
also let b ∈ {0, 1} be such that w is a witness for xb ∈ L; that is, (xb, w) ∈ RL.
Common input: instances x0, x1 for an NP-language L.
Private input of PL∨L: w s.t (x0, x1, w) ∈ RL∨L. where
RˆL∨L =
{
((x0, x1), w) :
(
(x0, w) ∈ RL ∧ x1 ∈ Lˆ
) ∨ ((x1, w) ∈ RL ∧ x0 ∈ Lˆ)}.
The protocol ΠL∨L:
1. PL∨L computes ab ← PL(xb, w), (a1−b, e1−b, z1−b)← Sim(x1−b) and sends (a0, a1) to VL∨L.
2. VL∨L chooses at random challenge e← {0, 1}l and sends e to PL∨L.
3. PL∨L sets eb = e⊕ e1−b, computes zb ← PL(xb, w, ab, eb) and outputs
(
(e0, e1), (z0, z1)
)
.
4. VL∨L
(
(x0, x1), (a0, a1), e, ((e0, e1), (z0, z1))
)
. VL∨L accepts if and only if e = e0 ⊕ e1 and
VL(x0, a0, e0, z0) = 1 and VL(x1, a1, e1, z1) = 1.
Theorem 3 ([CDS94, GMY03]). If ΠL is a HVZK 3-round public-coin proof system with optimal
soundness for NP-language L then ΠL∨L is a HVZK 3-round public-coin proof system with optimal
soundness for NP-language L ∨ L and is WI for polynomial-time relation
RL∨L =
{
((x0, x1), w) :
(
(x0, w) ∈ RL ∧ x1 ∈ L
) ∨ ((x1, w) ∈ RL ∧ x0 ∈ L)}.
Moreover if ΠL is perfect HVZK then ΠL∨L is perfect WI for polynomial-time relation RˆL∨L
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We remark that results of [CDS94, GMY03] are known to hold for Σ-protocols, but in the proof
of WI they use only HVZK. Therefore their results also hold starting from a HVZK 3-round public-
coin proof system with optimal soundness (and not necessarily special soundness) that we consider
in the above theorem. Indeed we observe that ΠL∨L has optimal soundness for the following reason.
Suppose that ΠL∨L does not enjoy optimal soundness. This means that for a false instance and
the same first round (a0, a1) there are two accepting conversation, namely:(
(a0, a1), e, ((e0, e1), (z0, z1))
)
,
(
(a0, a1), e
′, ((e′0, e
′
1), (z
′
0, z
′
1))
)
with e 6= e′. Then it must be the case that for some b = 0 or b = 1, eb 6= e′b and then (ab, eb, zb)
(ab, e
′
b, z
′
b) are two accepting transcripts with the same first round for the protocol ΠL, and thus
the optimal soundness of ΠL is violated.
It is possible to extend the above construction to handle two different NP-languages L0, L1 that
admit HVZK 3-round public-coin proof system with optimal soundness. Indeed by Theorem 2, we
can assume, without loss of generality, that L0 and L1 have 3-round public-coin proof systems ΠL0
and ΠL1 with the same challenge length.
Assuming that L0 and L1 have 3-round public-coin proof systems ΠL0 and ΠL1 that are HVZK
and have optimal soundness with the same challenge length. We can apply the same construction
outlined above to obtain a 3-round public-coin proof system ΠL0∨L1 that enjoys HVZK and has
optimal soundness for relation
RˆL0∨L1 =
{(
(x0, x1), w
)
:
(
(x0, w) ∈ RL0 ∧ x1 ∈ Lˆ1
) ∨ ((x1, w) ∈ RL1 ∧ x0 ∈ Lˆ0)}.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. If ΠL0 and ΠL1 are HVZK 3-round public-coin proof systems with optimal soundness
for NP-languages L0 and L1 then ΠL0∨L1 is a HVZK 3-round public-coin proof system with optimal
soundness for the for NP-language
L0 ∨ L1 = {(x0, x1) : x0 ∈ L0 ∨ x1 ∈ L1}
and is WI for polynomial-time relation
RL0∨L1 =
{
((x0, x1), w) :
(
(x0, w) ∈ RL0 ∧ x1 ∈ L1
) ∨ ((x1, w) ∈ RL1 ∧ x0 ∈ L0)}.
Moreover, if ΠL0 and ΠL1 are perfect then ΠL0∨L1 is perfect WI for polynomial-time relation RˆL∨L.
3 Non-Interactive Argument Systems
Some definitions presented in this section are taken from [Lin15].
Definition 6. A non-interactive argument system for an NP-language L consists of three PPT
machines (CRS,P,V), that have the following properties:
• Completeness: for all (x,w) ∈ RL, it holds that:
Prob [ σ ← CRS(1n);V(σ, x,P(σ, x, w)) = 1 ] = 1.
• Adaptive Soundness: for every PPT function f : {0, 1}poly(n) → {0, 1}n \L for all PPT prover
P?, there exists a negligible function ν, such that for all n:
Prob
[
σ ← CRS(1n);VO(σ, f(σ),P?O(σ)) = 1
]
≤ ν(n)
where O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n is a random function.
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Definition 7. A non-interactive argument system is adaptive unbounded zero knowledge (NIZK)
for an NP-language L if there exists a probabilistic PPT simulator S such that for every PPT
function
f : {0, 1}poly(n) →
(
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}poly(n)
)
∩RL,
and for every PPT malicious verifier V?, there exists a negligible function ν such that,∣∣∣Prob [ V? (Rf (Pf (n, p))) = 1 ]− Prob [ V? (Sf (n, p)) = 1 ]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(n)
where f1 and f2 denote the first and second output of f , respectively, and Rf (Pf (n, p)) and Sf (n, p)
denote the output from the following experiments:
Real proofs Rf (Pf (n, p)):
• σ ← CRS(1n) a common reference string is sampled.
• For i = 1, . . . , p(n) (initially ~x and ~pi are empty):
– xi ← f1(σ, ~x, ~pi): the next statement xi to be proven is chosen.
– pii ← P(σ, f1(σ, ~x, ~pi), f2(σ, ~x, ~pi)): the ith proof is generated.
– set ~x = x1 . . . xi and ~pi = pi1 . . . pii.
• output (σ, ~x, ~pi).
Simulation Sf (n, p):
• σ ← S(1n) a common reference string is sampled.
• For i = 1, . . . , p(n) (initially ~x and ~pi are empty):
– xi ← f1(σ, ~x, ~pi): the next statement xi to be proven is chosen.
– pii ← S(xi): simulator S generates a simulated proof pii that xi ∈ L.
– set ~x = x1 . . . xi and ~pi = pi1 . . . pii.
• output (σ, ~x, ~pi).
Definition 8. A non-interactive argument system is adaptive unbounded witness indistinguishable
(NIWI) for an NP-language L if for every PPT adversary V?, for every PPT function
f : {0, 1}poly(n) →
(
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}poly(n) × {0, 1}poly(n)
)
∩R∧L,
and for every polynomial p(·), there exists a negligible function ν such that∣∣∣Prob [ V?(RP,f0 (n, p)) = 1 ]− Prob [ V?(RP,f1 (n, p)) = 1 ]∣∣∣ ≤ ν(n),
where R∧L = {(x,w0, w1) : (x,w0) ∈ RL ∧ (x,w1) ∈ RL} and RP,fb is the following experiment.
RP,fb (n, p):
• σ ← CRS(1n).
• For i = 1, . . . , p(n) (initially ~x and ~pi are empty):
– (xi, w
0
i , w
1
i )← f(σ, ~x, ~pi):
statement xi to be proven and witnesses w
0
i , w
1
i for xi are generated.
– pii ← P(σ, xi, wbi ): the ith proof is generated.
– set ~x = x1 . . . xi and ~pi = pi1 . . . pii.
• output (σ, ~x, ~pi).
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4 NIWI Argument Systems from 3-Round HVZK Proofs
In this section we discuss the FS transform in the NPRO model in order to obtain a NIWI argument
system Π = (P,V) for a polynomial relation RL. We start from a 3-round public-coin WI HVZK
proof system with optimal soundness ΠL = (PL,VL) for the NP language L. P and V have access
to an NPRO H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. We describe Π below and we assume that the challenge length
of ΠL is the security parameter n.
Common input: instance x for NP-language L.
Private input to P: w s.t. (x,w) ∈ RL.
Common reference string: CRS samples a key s for a hash function family H and sets σ = s.
1. P → V: The prover P executes the following steps:
1.1. a← PL(x,w);
1.2. e← Hs(x, a);
1.3. z ← PL(x,w, a, e);
1.4. send pi = (a, e, z) to V.
2. V ′s output: V outputs 1 if and only if VL(x, a, e, z) = 1 and e = Hs(x, a).
The following theorem was proved by Yung and Zhao in [YZ06] (see Claim 1, page 4). For sake
of completeness, we provide a proof of the claim below.
Theorem 5 ([YZ06]). Let ΠL be a 3-round public-coin WI proof system for the polynomial relation
RL. Then Π is adaptive WI for RL in the CRS model.
Proof. We show that Π is adaptive WI for RL through the following hybrids.
1. H1 is the experiment RP,f0 (n, p) (Definition 8), where P for j = 1, . . . , p(n) executes Π and
outputs pij using the first of the two witnesses given in output by f .
2. Hi (with i > 0) differs from H1 in the first i interactions, where P executes Π using the
second witness given in output by f . Namely: P on input (xj , w1j ) executes Π and outputs
pij using w
1
j for all j : 1 ≤ j < i. Instead, for the interactions i ≤ j < p(n) + 1, P on input
(xj , w
0
j ) executes Π using w
0
j as a witness and outputs pij .
3. Hp(n)+1 is the experiment RP,f1 (n, p) (Definition 8), where P for j = 1, . . . , p(n) executes Π
and outputs pij using the second witness given in output by f .
Hi ≈ Hi+1: Suppose there exists a malicious adversary V? that distinguishes between the exper-
iments Hi and Hi+1 with 1 ≤ i ≤ p(n), then we can show that there exists an adversary A that
breaks the WI property of ΠL. The reduction works as follows.
1. For j = 1, . . . , i− 1, A on input (xj , w1j ) executes Π using w1j to obtain pij .
2. For j = i, A interacts with the WI challenger of ΠL as follows:
(a) A has on input (xj , w0j , w1j ) and sends it to the challenger of WI;
13
(b) the challenger computes and sends the first message aj to A;
(c) A computes ej = Hs(aj) and sends it to the challenger of WI;
(d) the challenger computes and sends zj to A;
(e) A sends pij = (aj , ej , zj) to V?;
(f) A adds to ~x the theorem xj and to ~pi the proof pij .
3. ∀j = i+ 1, . . . , p(n) A on input (xj , w0j ) executes Π using w0j to obtain pij .
4. Set ~x = x1, . . . , xp(n) and ~pi = pi1, . . . , pip(n).
A sends ~x and ~pi to V? and outputs what V? outputs.
We now observe that if the challenger of WI has used the first witness we are in Hi otherwise
we are in Hi+i. It follows that RP,f0 (n, p) ≡ H1 ≈ · · · ≈ Hp(n) ≈ Hp(n)+1 ≡ RP,f1 (n, p) to conclude
the proof.
Adaptive soundness. To prove soundness, we follow [Lin15] and use the fact that, for every
function g, with a sufficiently large co-domain, relation R = {(x, g(x))} is evasive [CGH04] in the
NPRO model. A relation R is evasive if, given access to a random oracle O, it is infeasible to find
a string x so that the pair (x,O(x)) ∈ R.
Theorem 6. Let ΠL be a 3-round public-coin proof system with optimal soundness for the NP-
language L, and let H be a non programmable random oracle. Then, Π is a non-interactive argu-
ment system with (adaptive) soundness for L in the NPRO model.
Proof. Completeness of Π follows from the completeness of ΠL. Let O be an NPRO. In order to
prove the soundness of Π we use the fact that for any function g, the relation R = {(x, g(x))} is
evasive. We define the function g s.t. g(x, a) = e, where there exists z such that the transcript
(a, e, z) is accepting for the instance x. If x /∈ L by the optimal soundness property we have that
for every a there is a single e for which there is some z so that (a, e, z) is accepting. Therefore g is
a function, as required and it follows that the relation R = {((x, a), g(x, a))} is evasive.
Suppose that there exists a polynomial function f and a malicious prover P? such that P?
proves a false statement (i.e., VO(σ, f(σ),P?O(σ)) = 1, where σ ← CRS(1n)) with non-negligible
probability, then there is an adversary A that finds (x, a) s.t. O(x, a) = g(x, a) with non-negligible
probability. The adversary A works as follows. First, it runs σ ← CRS(1n). Then it runs
(x, a, e, z) ← P?(σ). Finally it outputs (x,O(x, a)). From the contradicting assumption we know
that VO(σ, f(σ), (a, e, z)) = 1 with non-negligible probability. This implies that the transcript
(a,O(x, a), z) is accepting with non-negligible probability. Since x /∈ L there exists only one e for
which (a,O(x, a), z) is accepting. Therefore we have that with non-negligible probability it holds
that O(x, a) = e (i.e., O(x, a) = g(x, a)) and this contradicts the fact that any function g is evasive
for an NPRO.
5 Our Transform: Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge from HVZK
From the previous section we know that if we have a 3-round HVZK proof system with optimal
soundness ΠL∨Λ = (PL∨Λ,VL∨Λ) for polynomial relation
RˆL∨Λ = {((x, ρ), w) : ((x,w) ∈ RL ∧ ρ ∈ Λˆ) ∨ ((ρ, ω) ∈ RΛ ∧ x ∈ Lˆ)}
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that is also WI for polynomial relation
RL∨Λ = {((x, ρ), w) : ((x,w) ∈ RL ∧ ρ ∈ Λ) ∨ ((ρ, w) ∈ RΛ ∧ x ∈ L)} ,
we can apply the FS transform to make it non-interactive while preserving WI and soundness. The
protocol needs a common hash function that is modeled as an NPRO in the proof of soundness.
Here we make use of the above result in order to transform a 3-round HVZK proof system with
optimal soundness for an NP-language L into a NIZK argument for L in the CRS model using an
NPRO in the proof of soundness.
The transformed NIZK argument Π = (P,V) is described below.
Common input: instance x for an NP-language L.
Private input of P: w s.t (x,w) ∈ RL.
Common reference string: CRS on input 1n runs ρ ← SΛ(1, 1n) where Λ is an membership-
hard language and samples a key s for a hash function family H. Then it sets σ = (ρ, s).
P → V: P executes the following steps:
1. a← PL∨Λ((x, ρ), w);
2. e← Hs(x, a);
3. z ← PL∨Λ((x, ρ), w, a, e);
4. send pi = (a, e, z) to V.
V ′s output: V accepts if and only if VL∨Λ((x, ρ), a, e, z) = 1 and e = Hs(x, a).
In our construction we suppose that the challenge length of ΠΛ is n, where n denotes the security
parameter. Therefore to use the OR composition of [CDS94] we need to consider a 3-round public-
coin proof system with HVZK and optimal soundness ΠL for RL that has challenge length n (and
therefore soundness error 2−n). This is not a problem because we can use Theorem 2 to transform
every 3-round public-coin proof system with HVZK and optimal soundness with challenge n′ (where
n′ 6= n) to another one with challenge length n. More precisely, if n′ > n we can use Lemma 2
to reduce n′ to n almost for free. If n′ < n we need to use Lemma 1, therefore we have to run
multiple executions of ΠL to apply the OR composition of [CDS94]. Notice that this potential
computational effort is implicit also for the FS transform and for Lindell’s transform. Indeed if the
original 3-round public-coin proof system with HVZK and optimal soundness has just a one-bit (or
in general a short) challenge then clearly the resulting NIZK is not sound. Therefore the parallel
repetition of the 3-round public-coin proof system with HVZK and optimal soundness is required
before applying the transform in order to reduce the soundness error (see Section 2.2).
Theorem 7. Let ΠL∨Λ be a 3-round public-coin proof system for polynomial relation RˆL∨Λ that is
WI for polynomial relation RL∨Λ. Then Π is zero knowledge for RL in the CRS model.
Proof. The simulator S works as follows:
1. S on input 1n, runs (ρ, ω)← SΛ(0, 1n); samples a key s for a hash function and sets σ = {ρ, s}
and outputs σ.
2. S on input σ, ω and xi (for every i = 1, . . . , p(n)) computes a ← PL∨Λ((xi, ρ), ω), e ←
Hs(xi, a) and z ← PL∨Λ((xi, ρ), ω, a, e). It outputs pii = (a, e, z).
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We show that the output of S is computationally indistinguishable from a real transcript given
in output by P in a real execution of Π through the following hybrids games.
1. H0 is the experiment Rf (Pf (n, p)) (Definition 7).
2. H1 differs from H0 in the way that ρ is generated. Indeed in H1 we have that σ is computed
by running SΛ(0, 1
n). The second output ω of SΛ is not used. Clearly H0 and H1 are
indistinguishable otherwise the membership-hard property of Λ would be contradicted. More
details on this reduction will be given below.
3. H2 differs from H1 just on the witness used by PL∨Λ. Indeed now ω is used as witness. The
WI property of ΠL∨Λ guarantees that H2 can not be distinguished from H1. More details on
this reduction will be given below. Notice that H2 corresponds to the simulation.
H0 ≈ H1: If there exists a malicious verifier V? that distinguishes between H0 and H1, then there
exists an adversary A that breaks the membership-hard property of Λ. The reduction works as
follows.
1. A queries the challenger of SΛ that sends back ρ.
2. A samples a key s for a hash function family H and sets σ = {ρ, s}.
3. A on input (xi, wi) ∈ RL for i = 1, . . . , p(n) computes the following steps:
3.1. compute ai ← PL∨Λ((xi, ρ), wi);
3.2. compute ei ← Hs(xi, ai);
3.3. compute zi ← PL∨Λ((xi, ρ), wi, ai, ei);
3.4. set pii = (ai, ei, zi);
3.5. set ~x = x1, . . . , xi and ~pi = pi1, . . . , pii.
4. A sends σ, ~x, ~pi to V?.
5. A outputs the output of V?.
We now observe that if the challenger of a sampling algorithm SΛ sends ρ /∈ Λ we are in H0
otherwise we are in H1. This implies that H0 ≈ H1.
H1 ≈ H2: If there exists a distinguisher V? that distinguishes betweenH1 andH2, then there exists
an adversary A against the adaptive NIWI property of ΠL∨Λ, therefore contradicting Theorem 5.
The reduction works as follows.
1. A runs (ρ, ω)← SΛ(0, 1n), samples a key s for a hash function and sets σ = {ρ, s}.
2. A has on input a PPT function f = (f1, f2) and defines f ′ = (f ′1, f ′2) as follows:
f ′(σ,~t, ~pi) on input a CRS σ, a vector of theorems ~t = (x1, ρ), . . . , (xp(n), ρ) and a vector of
proofs ~pi = pi1, . . . , pip(n) returns (f1(σ, ~x, ~pi), ρ), (f2(σ, ~x, ~pi), ω).
3. A interacts with the challenger of adaptive NIWI, using f ′, in order to obtain xi, pii =
{ai, ei, zi}, for i = 1, . . . , p(n).
4. A sets ~x = x1, . . . , xp(n) and ~pi = pi1, . . . , pip(n).
5. A sends σ, ~x, ~pi to V? and outputs the output of V?.
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We now observe that if the challenger of NIWI uses the first witness wi we are in H1 otherwise
we are in H2. This implies that H1 ≈ H2.
We can thus conclude that H0 ≈ H1 ≈ H2 and therefore the output of S is computational
indistinguishable from a real transcript.
Theorem 8. Let ΠL∨Λ be a 3-round public-coin HVZK proof system with optimal soundness for
relation RL∨Λ, and WI for relation RˆL∨Λ, and let H be an NPRO. Then, Π is a non-interactive
argument system with adaptive soundness for the relation RL in the CRS model using the NPRO
model for soundness.
Proof. The completeness of Π follows from the completeness of ΠL∨Λ. In order to prove adaptive
soundness we notice that an adversarial prover proving a false statement x /∈ L can be directly
reduced to an adversarial prover proving a false statement for ΠL∨Λ in the NPRO model. This
contradicts Theorem 6. Indeed the only subtlety that is worthy to note is that when the adversarial
prover runs the protocol, we have that the statement “ρ ∈ Λ” stored in the CRS is false, therefore
if also the instance “x /∈ L” proved by the prover is false then the OR composition of the two
statements is also false.
6 Efficiency Comparison
In this section we illustrate in details Tables, 2 and 3 of Section 1.2 has been counted. First of all
we need to briefly introduce two Σ-protocols, one to prove that a tuple is DH(ΠDH [HL10]), and
the other one to prove that two graphs are isomorphic (ΠGH [GMW86]). Our comparison assumes
that the CRS is a DH tuple ((Gcrs, qcrs, pcrs, gcrs), Acrs, Bcrs, Ccrs) with pcrs and qcrs primes
such that pcrs = 2qcrs + 1 and |pcrs| = 1024. We distinguish two cases. In the first one the prover
wants to prove that a tuple ((G, q, p, g), A,B,C) is a DH tuple, and in the other one the prover
tries to convince the verifier that two graphs G0 and G1 with n vertices each are isomorphic.
A Σ-protocol for Diffie-Hellman tuples. We consider the following polynomial-time relation
RDH =
{(
((G, q, g), A = gr, B = h,C = hr), r
)
: Br = C
}
over cyclic groups G of prime-order q. Typically, G is the subgroup of quadratic residues of Zp for
prime p = 2q + 1. We next briefly describe Σ-protocol ΠDH = (PDH,VDH) for RDH.
Common input: instance x and language DH.
Private input of PDH: r.
The protocol ΠDH:
1. PDH picks t ∈ Zq at random, computes and sends a = gt , b = ht to VDH;
2. VDH chooses a random challenge e ∈ Zq and sends it to PDH;
3. PDH computes and sends z = t+ er to VDH;
4. VDH accepts iff:
gz = a ·Ae AND hz = b · Ce.
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We show the special HVZK simulator Sim for ΠDH. Sim, on input x and a challenge e of length
|q| − 1 executes the following steps:
1. randomly chooses z ∈ Zq;
2. computes a = gz ·A−e;
3. computes b = hz · C−e.
Graph isomorphism. We show a Σ-protocol ΠGH = (PGH,VGH) to prove that two graphs are
isomorphic. Given two graphs G0 and G1, prover PGH wants to convince verifier VGH that he knows
a permutation φ such that φ(G0) = G1.
Common input: theorem x = (G0, G1).
Private input of PGH: φ.
The protocol ΠGH:
1. PGH randomly chooses a permutation ψ and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, computes and sends P = ψ(Gb);
2. VGH chooses and sends a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} PGH;
3. PGH sends the permutation τ to VGH, where
τ =

ψ if b = b′
ψφ−1 if b = 0, b′ = 1
ψφ if b = 1, b′ = 0
4. VGH accepts if and only if P = τ(Gb′).
Computational effort: two cases. We show a summary of the comparison among our trans-
form and Lindell’s transform in Tables 2 and 3. The cost is measured by considering the computa-
tions in terms of number of exponentiations made by P and of V. In our comparison we consider
that a CRS contains a DH tuple ((Gcrs, qcrs, pcrs, gcrs), Acrs, Bcrs, Ccrs) with |pcrs| = n = 1024,
with security parameter n (therefore |qcrs| = 1023). We consider two cases. In the first one we use
the NIZK argument to prove that a tuple ((G, q, p, g), A,B,C) is a DH tuple; in particular we take
in account two sub-cases: when p = 1024 and when p = 2048. In the second case we use the NIZK
argument to prove the isomorphism between two graphs G0 and G1, and we assume that k = n
2
bits are needed to represent a graph with n vertices. We stress that Lindell’s transform needs to
commit the first round of a Σ-protocol (plus the instance to be proved, but for our comparison
we ignore that the instance has to be committed) associated to the language that we take into
account (the language of the DH tuples or the language of the isomorphic graphs). Therefore,
using the described CRS, to commit to a string of 1023 bit, 4 exponentiations are required. This
is a consequence of the fact that the commitment is made by executing the simulator associated
with ΠDH (with |qcrs| = 1023).
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Case 1: proving that a tuple is a DH tuple.
• [Lin15]. When the instance to be proved is ((G, q, p, g), A,B,C) with p = 1024, the prover
P needs to compute a = gt, b = ht (as describe before) and needs to commit to them. The
total size of a and b is 2048 bits, therefore to commit to 2048 bits we need to execute the DM
commitment 3 times. This implies that the prover needs to compute 3 · 4 exponentiations
mod pcrs and 2 exponentiations mod p. The verifier V needs to checks if open of the DM
commitments was correct, and also needs to compute gz = a · Aep and hz = b · Ce. For this
reason the verifier needs to compute 3 · 4 exponentiations mod pcrs plus 4 exponentiations
mod p. With the same arguments we can count the amount of exponentiations needed to
prove that the instance is a DH tuple with p = 2048.
• Our transform. When |p| = 1024 (resp., |p| = 2048) the prover need to run the simu-
lator Sim of ΠDH with the instance ((Gcrs, qcrs, pcrs, gcrs), Acrs, Bcrs, Ccrs) (this costs 4
exponentiations), also we need to compute a = gt , b = ht. The total number of ex-
ponentiations is 6 (2 exponentiations mod p, and 4 exponentiations mod pcrs). The ver-
ifier needs to perform two times the verifier’s algorithm for ΠDH, one with the instance
((Gcrs, qcrs, pcrs, gcrs), Acrs, Bcrs, Ccrs), the other one with the instance ((G, q, p, g), A,B,C),
for a total amount of 4 exponentiations mod pcrs, and 4 exponentiations mod p.
Case 2: Graph isomorphism.
• [Lin15]. We consider that the instance to be proved is composed by two graphs (G0, G1).
Also we assume that to represent one graph with n vertices k = n2 bits are necessary. In this
case we remark that because the security parameter is n = 1024 we need to execute n times
the protocol ΠGH described before. For the described assumptions we have that the first
round of ΠGH is P = σ(Gb) and |P | = n2. Therefore the prover needs to run n executions of
the DM commitment function to commit to P , where each of them costs 4 exponentiations.
Also we need to execute n iteration of this process, for a total amount of 4n2 exponentiations
mod pcrs. Even in this case the verifier needs to checks if all opens with respect to the n
commitments are correctly computed for a total amount of 4n2 exponentiations mod pcrs.
• Our transform. In this case the prover P computes only 4 exponentiations mod p to compute
the first round of ΠDH. The verifier runs the verifier’s algorithm of ΠDH and this requires 4
exponentiations mod p.
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A Dual Mode Commitments and the Need for Strong Σ-protocols
The following definition of a dual-mode commitment scheme (DMCS, in short) is from [Lin15].
Definition 9 ([Lin15]). A dual-mode commitment scheme (DMCS) is a tuple of PPT algorithms
(GenCRS,Com, Scom) such that:
• GenCRS(1n) outputs a common reference string, denoted by ρ.
• (GenCRS,Com): when ρ ← GenCRS(1n) and m ∈ {0, 1}n, algorithm Comρ(m; r) with ran-
domness r is a non-interactive perfectly-binding commitment scheme.
• (Com, Scom): For every PPT adversary A and every polynomial p(·), the output of the fol-
lowing two experiments is computationally indistinguishable:
RealCom,A(1n) SimulationScom(1n)
– ρ← GenCRS(1n)
– For i = 1, . . . , p(n):
1. mi ← A(ρ,~c, ~r)
2. ri ← {0, 1}poly(n)
3. ci = Comρ(mi; ri)
4. Set ~c = c1, . . . , ci and
~r = r1, . . . , ri
– Output A(ρ,m1, r1, . . . ,mp(n), rp(n))
– ρ← Scom(1n)
– For i = 1, . . . , p(n):
1. ci ← Scom
2. mi ← A(ρ,~c, ~r)
3. ri ← Scom(mi)
4. Set ~c = c1, . . . , ci and
~r = r1, . . . , ri
– Output A(ρ,m1, r1, . . . ,mp(n), rp(n))
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Membership-hard languages with efficient sampling. Lindell defines a membership-hard
language Λ as a language such that one can efficiently sample both instances that belong to the
language and instances that do not belong to the language. Still distinguishing among these two
types of instances is hard. This is formalized through a sampling algorithm SΛ that on input a bit
b outputs an instance ρ ∈ Λ along with a witness ω when b = 0, and outputs an instance ρ 6∈ Λ
otherwise. No polynomial-time distinguisher on input ρ can guess b with probability non-negligibly
better than 1/2. Let SρΛ denote the instance part of the output (i.e., without the witness when b is
0).
Definition 10 ([Lin15]). Let Λ be a language. We say that Λ is membership-hard with efficient
sampling if there exists a PPT sampler SΛ such that for every PPT distinguisher D there exists
a negligible function µ such that: |Prob [ D(SρΛ(0, 1n), 1n) = 1 ] − Prob [ D(SΛ(1, 1n), 1n) = 1 ] | ≤
µ(n).
There are several popular membership-hard languages in literature. We will in particular con-
sider the one considered by Lindell in [Lin15]: the language DH of Diffie-Hellman triples.
Lindell’s construction of a DMCS from Σ-protocols. Let us describe Lindell’s construction
of a DMCS from any membership-hard language Λ admitting a Σ-protocol ΠΛ = (PΛ,VΛ) with
simulator SimΛ for perfect special HVZK.
Regular ρ generation: Run sampler SΛ for Λ with input (1, 1
n) and receive back ρ (recall that
ρ /∈ Λ).
Commitment: To commit to a value m ∈ {0, 1}n with randomness r, Com sets e = m, runs
SimΛ(ρ, e) with randomness r and obtains (a, z). The output of Com is the commitment c = a
and the decommitment information (e, r).
Decommitment: To decommit, provide e, z and the receiver checks that VΛ(ρ, a, e, z) = 1.
Simulator Scom:
• On input 1n, Scom runs the sampler SΛ with input (0, 1n), and receives back (ρ, ω)
(recall that ρ ∈ Λ and ω is a witness to this fact). Then, Scom computes a = PΛ(ρ, ω),
sets c = a and outputs (c, ρ).
• On input m ∈ {0, 1}n, Scom sets e = m and outputs z = PΛ(ρ, ω, a, e).
A.1 A Subtlety in Lindell’s Construction: the Need of Strong Σ-protocols
We now discuss a subtlety in the construction of a DMCS from any Σ-protocol for a membership-
hard language given in [Lin15]. We stress that the content of this section does not apply when
considering [Lin14].
We observe that the construction of a DMCS from any Σ-protocol for a membership-hard
language given in [Lin15] works when the Σ-protocol is equipped with a simulator such that when
the simulator gets as randomness the 3rd round of the prover, then the simulator is able to output
the same first round of the prover. This special property has been investigated in [Dod09] where it
was called strong perfect special HVZK.
In more details, a Σ-protocol is strong perfect special HVZK if it admits a simulator Sim that
on input any challenge e outputs a transcript (a, e, z) that is perfectly indistinguishable from the
distribution of the transcript generated by the prover when the challenge is e, but in addition it is
required that the transcript is computed by sampling the 3rd round uniformly at random.
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The strong perfect special HVZK property is formalized below.
Definition 11 ([Dod09]). The special perfect HVZK property is strong if there exists a PPT sim-
ulator Sim for the special perfect HVZK property that on input x ∈ LR and a challenge “e” works
by sampling the 3rd round “z” uniformly at random and then computing the 1st round “a” deter-
ministically from “x, e” and “z”.
Lindell’s construction of a DMCS showed in [Lin15] requires a simulator for strong perfect
special HVZK.
A Σ-protocol ΠDH for DH. Now we show an artificial but useful example that shows a Σ-
protocol with a simulator Sim for perfect special HVZK that however does not work if strong
perfect special HVZK is desired.
The most widely used Σ-protocol ΠDH = (PDH ,VDH) for the language DH consists in running
in parallel two instances of a Σ-protocol for DLog each proving knowledge a discrete logarithm.
The two instances are linked together by having the verifier send the same challenge and expecting
to receive the same third-round message. Schnorr’s protocol [CP90] constitutes a natural choice
for a Σ-protocol for DLog.
Consider instead instantiating the Σ-protocol for DH with the following Σ-protocol ΠDLog =
(PDLog,VDLog) for proving knowledge of the discrete logarithm w of x with base g. PDLog first
selects another random group element x′ along with its discrete logarithm w′ to the base g and
then sends x′ to VDLog. Then PDLog and VDLog run two instances of Schnorr’s Σ-protocol using
the same challenge so that PDLog proves to VDLog knowledge of both w and w′. Clearly, ΠDLog is a
Σ-protocol for DLog (this comes from the fact that the AND of two Σ-protocols is still a Σ-protocol
and from the fact that knowledge of a pair (w,w′) implies knowledge of w) and, consequently, ΠDH
instantiated with ΠDLog is a Σ-protocol for DH. Moreover notice that ΠDLog admits a simulator
Sim?DLog for perfect HVZK that uses the simulator of Schnorr’s protocol to compute the transcript
of the first instance, while it uses the prover of Schnorr’s protocol for producing the transcript
associated to x′, after having selected x′ along with a witness w′ when the protocol starts.
We now provide a formal description of this Σ-protocol.
More precisely we show a Σ-protocol ΠDLog = (PDLog,VDLog) for relationRDLog = {((G, g, q, x), w) :
x = gw} that is special perfect HVZK and such that there exists a simulator for special perfect
HVZK that does not satisfy the requirement of strong perfect special HVZK of ΠDLog (see Def. 11).
Common Input: (G, g, q, x) and relation RDLog.
Input of PDLog: w s. t. ((G, g, q, x), w) ∈ RDLog.
The protocol ΠDLog:
1. The prover PDLog chooses r0, r1, w1 at random from Zq, and g1 at random from G. Then it
computes (a0, a1) = (g
r0 , gr11 ), and x1 = g
w1
1 . PDLog sends (a0, g1, x1, a1) to VDLog.
2. The verifier VDLog chooses a random challenge e ← {0, 1}l (where 2l < q) and sends e to
PDLog.
3. PDLog computes z0 = r0 + ew and z1 = r1 + ew1. PDLog sends (z0, z1) to VDLog.
4. VDLog checks gz0 = a0xe and gz11 = a1xe1 accepts if and only if it is the case.
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Special HVZK The simulator Sim of ΠDLog on input the theorem (G, g, q, x) and challenge e
works as follows:
1. pick z0, r1, w1 at random from Zq and g1 at random from G.
2. compute a0 = g
z0x−e and a1 = gr11 .
3. compute x1 = g
w1
1 and z1 = r1 + ew1.
4. return (a0, g1, x1, a1, z0, z1).
Completeness. In order to see that completeness holds, observe that when PDLog runs the
protocol honestly we have:
gz0 = gr0+we = gr0 · gwe = a0 · xe and gz11 = gr1+w1e1 = gr11 · gw1e1 = a1 · xe1.
Special soundness. Let (a0, g1, x1, a1, e, z0, z1) (a0, g1, x1, a1, e
′, z′0, z′1) be a collision. We have
that gz0 = a0x
e and gz
′
0 = a0x
e′ , and thus we have gz0−z′0 = xe−e′ that implies that x = g
z0−z′0
e−e′ ,
therefore w =
z0−z′0
e−e′ .
Special perfect HVZK. We now check that the transcript returned by Sim, on input the the-
orem (G, g, q, x) and challenge e, is identically distributed w.r.t. the transcript obtained from the
interaction between PDLog and VDLog, when the challenge is e. The transcript differs only in the
computation of a0 and z0. In the case of the PDLog a0 = gr0 where r0 is chosen uniformly at random
and z0 = r0 + ew. Instead, Sim chooses z0 uniformly at random and r0 = z0− ew, therefore clearly
Sim and PDLog produce a0 and z0 with the same distribution.
ΠDH does not produce a DMCS. We observe that Lindell’s construction of a DMCS from
any Σ-protocol for a membership-hard language [Lin15] does not seem to work when ΠDH is used
as Σ-protocol. Indeed consider the steps of experiments RealCom,A(1n) and SimulationScom(1n) in
which A obtains as input (ρ,~c, ~r) and consider iteration with i = 2 of the loop.
In RealCom,A(1n), A’s view includes (m1, r1, c1) and thus A can check that indeed c1 is the
output of Com(m1; r1). This means that in the above construction, c1 is the first component of the
pair given in output by SimΛ(ρ, e) when running with randomness r1, and this is precisely the way
in which c1 was produced in Step 3 when i = 1. Therefore the check of A succeeds in RealCom,A(1n).
In SimulationScom(1
n), A’s view includes (m1, r1, c1) and thus A can still perform the check
that c1 is the output of Com(m1; r1) by running SimΛ(ρ, e) with randomness r1. However, in
this case it is not true that c1 is computed by running Com(m1; r1). Indeed, in the execution of
SimulationScom(1
n), c1 is computed by running c1 ← Scom and then r1 is computed by running
r1 ← Scom(m1). In the above construction Scom computes c1 and r1 as the 1st and 3rd messages
that are computed by PΛ when the challenge is m1. Therefore whenever the 3rd round r1 computed
by PΛ does not correspond to a randomness that can be given as input to SimΛ(ρ,m1) to get the
same c1 computed by PΛ, we have that the check of A fails.
By noticing that the 3rd round r1 of PDH in ΠDH does not give any information about the
random instance x′ of DLog that P ′DH would compute and that would be part of c1, we have that
there exists a simulator for DH, using internally Sim?DLog, that on input (ρ,m1) and running with
randomness r1 computes c1 only with negligible probability and thus the above A is a successful
distinguisher of experiments RealCom,A(1n) and SimulationScom(1n).
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B An Optimal-Sound (and Not Special Sound) 3-Round Perfect
Special HVZK Proof
In this section we show a 3-round public-coin perfect special HVZK proof system that is optimal
sound and not special sound. First of all we briefly describe the Σ-protocol of [MP03] to prove that,
given a commitment com and a message m, m is committed in com. Then we show the protocol
of [Vis06], that is a modification of [MP03], where given a commitment com and a value Ψ, allows
to prove that the discrete logarithm of Ψ is committed in com.
In order to describe the protocol of [MP03] and [Vis06] we consider two prime p and q s.t.
p = 2q+ 1, a group of order G of order q such that the DDH assumption is hard. Also we consider
two random elements, g and h, taken from G.
We next describe Σ-protocol ΠCom = (PCom,VCom) of [MP03] for relation
RCom =
{((
(G, q, g, h), v, com = (gˆ, hˆ)
)
, w
)
: gˆ = gw, hˆ = hw+v
}
.
Common Input: (G, g, v, h, com = (gˆ, hˆ), q) and relation RCom.
Input of PCom: w s.t. ((G, v, g, h, com = (gˆ, hˆ), q), w) ∈ RCom.
The protocol ΠCom:
1. The prover PCom chooses r from Zq and sends (g˜ = gr, h˜ = hr) to VCom;
2. The verifier VCom chooses a random challenge e← Zq and sends e to PCom;
3. PCom sends z = ew + r to VCom;
4. VCom checks that gˆeg˜ = gz and
(
hˆ
hv
)e
h˜ = hz accepts if and only if the checks are successful.
In [Vis06] a similar protocol was used to prove that com is a commitment of the discrete logarithm
of a value Ψ ∈ G with hψ = Ψ. Formally the protocol is for the NP language
L =
{(
Ψ = hψ, com = (gˆ = gw, hˆ = hw+ψ)
)
: g, h← G, ψ ∈ Zq, w ∈ Zq
}
and for the corresponding relation
RL =
{(
(Ψ = hψ, com = (gˆ = gw, hˆ = hw+ψ)), (w,ψ)
)
: g, h← G, ψ ∈ Zq, w ∈ Zq
}
The protocol follows ΠCom with the differences that the common input is (G, q, g,Ψ = hψ, h, com =
(gˆ, hˆ)) and that the verifier decide whether to accept or not checking if it holds that gˆeg˜ = gz and(
hˆ
Ψ
)e
h˜ = hz. While this protocol preserves the perfect special HVZK property, it is not a proof
of knowledge for RL neither special sound even though it still enjoys optimal soundness. We now
proceed more formally.
Optimal soundness. We now consider an instance that is not in the NP language L, and show
that, once the first round of the protocol is fixed, there exists only one challenge e s.t. the
prover can answer successfully computing the third round z of the protocol. Consider the in-
stance
(
Ψ = hψ, com = (gˆ = gw, hˆ = hw+ψ′)
)
/∈ L (with ψ 6= ψ′). Assume by contradiction that
given the fist round of the protocol (g˜, h˜) there exist two distinct challenges e0 and e1 for which
the prover can make the verifier accept with answers z0, z1 respectively. In the end we prove that
ψ = ψ′.
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Proof. Since the verifier accepts, it must be that for all i ∈ {0, 1}, the following checks are successful:
• gˆei g˜ = gzi ;
•
(
hˆ
Ψ
)ei
h˜ = hzi .
It follows that gˆe0−e1 = gz0−z1 and
(
hˆ
Ψ
)e0−e1
= hz0−z1 . Suppose that h = gω, we get
gwω(e0−e1) = gˆ(e0−e1)ω = g(z0−z1)ω = h(z0−z1) =
(
hˆ
Ψ
)e0−e1
= hz0−z1 = gω(w+ψ′−ψ)(e0−e1).
Therefore, if e0 6= e1 we get the contradiction that ψ = ψ′.
ΠCom is not special sound for RL. To argue that the protocol of [Vis06] is not special sound,
we note that in order to compute a commitment com of the discrete logarithm of Ψ, knowledge
of this discrete logarithm is not necessary since it is possible to compute com = (gˆ, hw · Ψ) with
w ∈ Zq. Indeed, notice that the discrete logarithm ψ of Ψ is never used in the proof. Formally, we
suppose that the protocol is special sound for the polynomial relation RL and then construct an
adversary A that, given Y = gy ∈ G, returns the discrete logarithm y of Y .
We have shown that there exist 3-round public-coin proof systems that are optimal sound and
not special sound. It also easy to observe that special soundness implies optimal soundness.
Indeed, consider an NP-Language L. All Σ-protocols for RL must also be 3-round HVZK proofs
for L with optimal soundness. If not, than the violation of optimal soundness (P? for a false
statement can generate (a, c, z) and (a, c′, z′) with c′ different from c and both accepting) implies
directly also a violation of special soundness.
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